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DA VI D D E M E R I T T

CUBAN A N NEX A TIO N , SLAVE POW ER PARANOIA,
AND T H E COLLAPSE OF T H E D EM OCRATIC PARTY
IN MAINE, 1850-1854
“T h e extensive business connections w hich exist between
the citizens of our w hole State and Cuba make the invasion of
th at island a m atter of great im p o rta n ce.” So spoke the
Portland Advertiser on May 29, 1850 as it reported the latest
news of the Cardenas Expedition, a privately organized assault
on the Spanish colony launched from New O rleans w ith Amer
ican money, men, and m unitions. Despite a num ber of strong
com m ercial interests in Cuba, Mainers, except for a few news
paper com m ents like the above, expressed little concern about
the first two such annexationist efforts in 1850 and 1851. Sev
eral years later, however, rabid sectional p aranoia colored their
reaction to a sim ilar effort in 1854. In that year, the Pine Tree
State’s im passioned outcry against Cuban annexation not only
helped to defer Am erican im perial designs on the island, but
also served as a lig h tn in g rod for rhetoric w hich em erging party
leaders used to cement a new political synthesis that pushed the
natio n closer to Civil War.
T h is transform ation of sentim ent poses several im portant
historical questions. Why did Maine, a northern state, favor
C uban annexation at all? W hat happened in three short years
that changed people’s m inds so completely? How could their
reactions have affected the destinies of both the U nited States
and Cuba so dram atically? T he answers to these questions
m ight reveal som ething about antebellum political life.
Early rum ors of the Cardenas Expedition filtered back to
M aine in late May of 1850. T h e first dispatches conflicted
widely, but by the m iddle of Ju n e the true com position of this
filibustering mission, as such invasions were termed, and its
eventual result had become apparent to the Pine T ree State’s
anxious observers.1In callous disregard both of U.S. and in ter
n ational law, Narciso Lopez, a Cuban revolutionary, aided by
the H avana Club, a New York based um brella organization for
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The entrance to the harbor at Havana. Maine’s extensive trade with Cuba — an
exchange of wood and agricultural products for sugar and molasses — left the state
vulnerable to deteriorating diplomatic relations with Spain and its colony. Repeated
attempts to annex Cuba, coupled with the incendiary slavery issue, were the shoals
upon which the Democratic party was wrecked in Maine. Ballou, History of Cuba
(1854).

exiled Creoles an d southern annexationists, recruited an army
of some six hundred mercenaries and sailed from New Orleans
for Cardenas. There, the arrival of Spanish reinforcem ents
forced the filibusterers to beat a hasty retreat back to Key West,
where the Spanish could only protest their escape.2
U ndaunted by this first failure to incite C ubans to rebel
lion, Lopez set about organizing another invasion. Influential
southerners, like M ississippi G overnor Jo h n Q uitm an, not
only offered financial assistance but also helped the filibuster
ers evade neutrality laws.3 T h e section's vehement expansion
ists, w ho were p opularly know n as “Y oung A m erica,” saw
C uba and C entral America as an o p p o rtu n ity to extend their
peculiar institution, which, by the 1850s, appeared to have
reached its natural lim it. If annexed, the Spanish colony, w ith
its flourishing slave plantations, w ould have provided the
South w ith m ore power in Congress. Moreover, its fully
stocked slave m arkets offered a solution to chronic labor
shortages, w hich were the greatest obstacle to increasing cotton
p ro d u ctio n .4 De B o w ’s Review, published in New Orleans, the
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center of the filibuster movement, outlined these argum ents in
a series of influential articles on C uban annexation. T h is line
of reasoning rendered “ the acquisition of C uba ... the only
m easure of policy in regard to w hich the people of the South
feel any special and present interest.”5
A lthough the filibusterers were greeted w ith warm feelings
in the southern U nited States, their reception in C uba rendered
this support im m aterial; the second invasion failed even more
disastrously than the first. Lopez and alm ost all of the men in
the Bahia H onda Expedition were captured and executed by
Spanish authorities. T h eir failure was inevitable. As W illiam
C rittenden, nephew of U. S. Attorney G eneral Jo h n J. C rit
tenden, noted bitterly in the letter he was allowed to compose
before his execution and subsequent dism em berm ent at the
hands of a H avana mob, “We have been grossly deceived ...
D uring my short sojourn in this island I have not met a single
p a tr io t... I am sure t h a t ... Lopez has no friends.”6 A nnexation
to the U nited States had few advocates in Cuba.

I n the Maine press, however, annexation was p o p u lar and
received considerable support, alth o u g h o p in io n on the fili
buster m issions was generally divided along party lines: Demo
crats were sym pathetic and W higs critical. T h e Republican
Journal of Belfast was typical, presum ing “ that not one Am eri
can o u t of one hundred w ould be sorry to see the adventurers
succeed.” 7 T h e Democracy’s standard carrier and its oldest
p ap er in M aine, the Eastern Argus of P ortland, followed w ith
an article listing “a p o rtion of the grievances of w hich the
C ubans co m p lain ,” and adding, “We do not think they greatly
over-state them .” Such statem ents were as vehement as any in
the South. Later, both papers were also loud supporters of the
ill-fated Bahia H onda m ission.8
M aine’s Whigs, on the other hand, were more reserved.
They “d istru sted ] the motives of these new invaders, and can
not rejoice at their prospective success.” T h e Bangor W hig and
Courier elaborated a “conviction that the present m o v em en t...
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is not ... so m uch in behalf of h u m an freedom as of h u m an
slavery.” N ativist sentim ents lay at the heart of Portland Adver
tiser objections to C uban invasion: “We do not w ant a m illion
of slaves added to those we already have.” T h e W hig organ
closest to proceedings in the state capitol, the Kennebec Jour
nal, sum m arized both these argum ents. D istrust of the “p ri
vate, sinister and sectional m otives” of the filibusterers and an
“aversion to any m ore slaves” added grist to com plaints about
expeditions “in violation of law and of repeated promises ... to
the Spanish governm ent by ours.”9
Such partisan fidelity, however, was often difficult to
m aintain when, as in the case of filibustering, the in stitu tio n of
slavery was at issue. In Bangor, the Jeffersonian broke from
D em ocratic regulars in its belief that the invaders’ “flag of Free
Cuba ... w ould be more appropriately styled the T la g of C u t
throat B andits,’ if it is intended to be the symbol of the expedi
tion to invade C uba.” Its editors, Joseph Bartlett and Benjam in
Burr, earned the scorn of their neighbor, the Democrat, w hich
loudly endorsed the “ liberators of C u b a” and fiercely defended
the rights of the filibusterers.10 U nder pressure, Bartlett and
B urr soon stepped back from com plete o p p o sitio n an d
acknowledged “ the oppressive yoke of tyrants in C u b a,” but
m aintained that “ there is a rig h t way and a w rong way to aid
the dow ntrodden.” 11 Whigs, in Bangor at least, were no more
unanim ous. In this city, the Mercury and the W hig and Cour
ier, two sheets pledging loyalty to Clay’s party, quarreled over
filibustering. T he Mercury endorsed C uban annexation, w hile
its rival was critical.12 Such intraparty conflicts grew increas
in g ly com m on u n d er the strain of co n tin u e d slavery
ag itatio n .13
N onetheless filibustering rem ained only a relatively
m in o r issue. In fact, distance from the coast of M aine an d its
robust trade w ith C uba reduced interest in this m atter consider
ably. In Portland, the center of this commerce, news and editor
ials about filibustering were prom inently featured in both the
Portland Advertiser and the Eastern A rgus. T h e latest inform a
tion consistently appeared, w ith bold headlines, in the first
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colum n of these two sheets. Nestled am ong them was the
H avana m arket news w hich gave these bulletins their over
rid in g im portance. Farther inland, the Oxford Democrat also
reported dispatches from L opez’s expeditions, but they
appeared on the back pages and received little emphasis. In
fact, its South Paris editors took no position on either inva
sio n .14 Indifference to C uban affairs was also the reaction in
F arm ington. Bulletins in the Chronicle were placed at the
bottom of the last colum ns w ith neither headlines nor boldface.
No editorials appeared, but hints of antipathy towards the
Bahia H onda mission and its idea of “extending slavery”
emerged in a feature on presidential hopefuls.15 In DoverFoxcroft, the Piscataquis Observer waited until late June 1850
to jo in regular Democrats in advocating “a radical reform in
the mode of governing C uba.” It was a little quicker to hop on
the bandw agon for the second invasion, but the event received
little attention. Generally, the death of former New H am pshire
governor Levi W oodbury seemed far more im portant to these
inland editors.16
Controversy over filibustering was further minimized
because most editors accepted the prevailing expansionist doc
trine of the era: Manifest Destiny. T he Saco Democrat invoked
this very phrase: “ Most people believe that it is Uncle Sam ’s
manifest destiny to possess all the land that joins him . T he only
question is, as to the time and m anner of occupying the lan d .” 17
Americans felt deeply that conquest had been preordained, and
the recent past certainly seemed to bear this out. T h e huge
L ouisiana Purchase was supplem ented by the purchase of F lor
ida. Later, Texas was annexed, and California conquered.
Cuba w ould come nex t.18
Sitting only ninety miles offshore, the island was seen by
Americans as a natural addition to the republic. A lecturer in
Bangor described to his attentive audience “ the day w hen Cuba
will be annexed to the U nited States and its resources developed
fully, its p o p u latio n increased and ... [the island] made the
garden of the w orld.” 19 M ainers like J. C. H um phreys, a
Brunsw ick box shook m anufacturer w ith interests in the
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island, were confident that "C uba is undoubtedly ours ... if we
w ant it.” 20 A nother New Englander, Jo h n Q uincy Adams,
appealed to science to explain the inevitability of the islan d ’s
annexation.
T h ere are laws of p o litical as well as physical
gravitation, and if an apple, severed by the tempest
from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the
ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own u n 
natural connection w ith Spain, and incapable of selfsu p p o rt can gravitate only towards the N orth A m eri
can U nion, w hich by the same law of nature, cannot
cast her off from its bosom.21
None of these men were supporters of the slavery extension that
lay behind southern filibustering. They saw other reasons for
the U nited States to shake the tree. Astraddle sea-lanes into the
G ulf of Mexico and around Cape H orn to the Pacific, Cuba
occupied a position from w hich a hostile navy could interdict
traffic between the eastern seaboard and ports in the G ulf and
Pacific. Its strategic im portance was remarked u p o n by such
different American presidents as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe,
Q uincy Adams, Polk, Pierce, and B uchanan.22 Such a rationale
could not have escaped M aine’s many sailors and sea-captains.
Repeated slights by Spanish officials towards American
citizens and their flag gave annexationists further im petus and
helped blur the partisan divisions that stood in their way.
A lthough such actions were the inevitable result of deteriorat
in g relations caused by filibustering, Americans were u n 
sym pathetic to Spanish explanations. Most believed that such
behavior could not be tolerated. Even the W hig press com 
plained of “ the firing at American steamers” and warned o m i
nously that Americans "cannot be molested w ith im p u n ity .”
M eanw hile Democrats made hay of such events in their calls for
the islan d ’s acquisition.23

I n Maine, tariffs created a pow erful econom ic m otive for
picking the C uban apple. 24 In retaliation for the Cardenas
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As chairman of the Senate Commerce
Committee. Hannibal Hamlin was a pow
erful spokesman for the shipping and ship
building interests of his home state. Ham
lin's committee condemned Spanish duties
that discriminated against American prod
ucts shipped to Cuba; others called for
annexation of the island colony. Maine
Historical Society Collections.

E xpedition, S pain raised its already high tariffs on American
products and instituted new carrying duties that discrim inated
heavily against vessels flying the Stars and Stripes.2'’A Treasury
D epartm ent report requested by the Senate Commerce C om 
mittee, chaired by M aine’s H annibal H am lin, concluded that
these duties and U. S. measures to retaliate against them
"caused a large portion of a valuable trade w hich legitim ately
belonged to the U nited States to pass in to o th er han d s.”26 Many
of these ships w ould have carried the products of Downeast
loggers, farmers, and fisherfolk.
T h e deleterious effect of these fees was, in fact, of p articu 
lar interest to H a m lin ’s constituents. In general, shipow ners
were am ong the leading northern advocates of Cuban annexa
tion.27 M aine’s bountiful forests and many harbors made sh ip 
pin g and sh ip b u ild in g two of the state’s most im portant indus
tries. For most of the nineteenth century, Downeast shipyards
built more ships w ith greater tonnage than those of any other
state. In 1850, "n o other state built half as m any, except New
York.”28 Many of these vessels stayed in M aine or operated out
of its ports. Bath and Portland were fifth and n in th respectively
in an 1857 list of American cities where the greatest am ount of
registered sh ip p in g wras owned.29 T h e state’s press com plained
bitterly about the new Spanish tariff, estim ated to have cost the
American m erchant marine $60,000,000 an n u ally .80
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At the same time, A m erican tariffs were of the greatest
concern to the state’s sugar merchants. Despite her canefields in
L ouisiana, the U nited States was one of the w o rld ’s largest
sugar im porters; most of this came from C uba.31 Between 1840
and 1860 the consum ption of sugar increased two or three times
as fast as the p o pulation, and by 1860 reached close to thirty
pounds per capita. A m ericans quickly grew even hungrier for
sweets: By 1880 they were eating thirty-eight pounds of sugar
per person per year.32 In Maine, sugar products in the form of
molasses were an essential p art of the lum ber cam p diet, con
sidered “as a [more] necessary part of the supplies than alm ost
any other article.”33
Sales of sugar and molasses were constricted by tariffs paid
on these articles when they were im ported. T h e tariff of 1846 set
sugar duties on a scale ranging from two and a half to twelve
cents per pound; im ported molasses paid five cents per g al
lo n .34 Such fees added considerably to the price of this article of
everyday consum ption. H annibal H am lin expressed a view
com m on in Maine w hen he said, “We have our molasses, sugar,
etc. from Cuba, and these are strong reasons why it [Cuba]
should belong to this co u n try .”35 These im ports were at the
heart of a chronic trade deficit w ith the island that between 1854
and 1858 had reached a w h o p p in g $88,556,299. T his worrisome
drain on American gold reserves w arranted Congressional
investigation.36 T h e Portland Advertiser also acknowledged,
though som ewhat begrudgingly, that “ the great cry of ‘cheap
su g ar’ ... has made the an nexation of Cuba an acceptable if not
p o p u la r measure w ith so large a p ro portion of all political
parties and sections of this country.”37
Portland, at the center of a huge re-exporting business,
enhanced its w ealth in the sugar trade. Its position as the leader
of the box and barrel trade to Cuba gave its com m ission m er
chants, like W. W. W oodbury, w ho em ployed agents on the
island both selling lum ber and buying sugar, a huge advantage
over those in other cities.38 Such men helped make the city
second only to New York in the sugar trade. In 1857 alone,
P o rtlan d im ported 3,961,689 gallons of molasses and 6,639,744
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John Bundy Brown's huge sugar refinery in Portland served as an impressive symbol of Maine’s
commercial links to Cuba — links that were increasingly threatened by Spanish tariffs. Maine Historical
Society Collections.

pounds of sugar, w orth SI,350,901.39 Much of this went to Jo h n
Bundy Brown, whose sugar refinery used 40,000 barrels of
molasses a year to m anufacture higher grades of sugar.40 His
eight-story factory, covering more than an acre of ground,
employed two hundred hands and was by far the state’s largest
single em ployer. T h e refinery annual ly produced $ 1,350,000 in
sugar, an article w hich was quickly becom ing a vital part of the
American diet.41 Brow n’s enterprise was not unique. O ne 1858
voyage of the Diligence, from Matanzas to Portland, carried
sugar and molasses to three different com m ission m erchants as
well as smaller quantities to three other individuals.42
T h e state’s farmers also suffered at the hands of Spanish
custom s officials, who singled out American flour for p articu 
lar attention: American flour paid $10.81 a ton w hile Spanish
paid only $2.50 a ton. W ith the new tariff, the value of U. S.
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flour exports to Cuba sank from $528,635 in 1847 to a virtually
nonexistent $6,665 in 1850. O ne of A m erica’s largest exports
was thus excluded from a m arket of 800,000 to 900,000 barrels a
year, w hich “w ould be enjoyed,” the Treasury D epartm ent
noted w ith dismay, “alm ost exclusively by the U nited States. ”43
A lthough Downeast wheat harvests had been steadily declin
ing, it rem ained a staple of considerable im portance for frontier
areas of northern and eastern M aine.44 Exclusion was p articu 
larly g allin g because South America and the islands of the
C aribbean had long been markets of p aram o u n t im portance to
Am erican farmers. W ithout them, grain and particularly
“flour exports w ould have approached the vanishing p o in t in
m uch of the period between 1820 and 1845.”45
M aine’s most im p o rtan t econom ic tie, however, was a
vigorous trade exchanging lum ber for C u b a’s sugar and
molasses. Between 1854 and 1858 sawmills in the Pine Tree
State cut alm ost a third of the $15,413,771 in lum ber sent from
the U nited States to the Spanish colony. M uch of this was in the
im p o rtan t barrel and box markets where Downeast m erchants,
led by those from Portland, controlled well over half of all such
exports.46 T he Bangor Mercury, a W hig sheet, thought that
“accession of the Island of Cuba ... will benefit Maine, ... and
Bangor more particularly, [because] ... it w ould have a vast
effect on our lum ber trade, and add largely to our prosperity.”47
Given these im portant economic interests in Cuba, p articu 
larly in the lum ber trade, it is no surprise that annexation
found its leading supporters in M aine in the lum ber entrepots
of P ortland and Bangor.
W hile C uban annexation offered an end to these onerous
com m ercial restrictions and prom ised increased sales and p rof
its, at least in the eyes of its enthusiastic prom oters in Maine,
supporters of filibustering chose instead to play on the general
sym pathy for an “oppressed people” that even their opponents
shared.48 They cast American intervention as “ the infusion of a
sterner, more self denying, and enterprising race.”49 H igh taxes
and tyranny from abroad were but “a portion of the grievances”
w hich the Eastern Argus did “not think they [the Cubans]
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greatly over-state/’50 S p ain ’s harsh reprisals against revolu
tionary activity evoked memories of Valley Forge and Bunker
H ill, and Americans hoped to play France to C u b a’s thirteen
colonies.
D emocratic sheets exploited this im age to dispel the
notion that filibusterers were buccaneers who exclusively
represented the slavery interests of the South. T h e Piscataquis
Observer fiercely defended foreign interference by “individuals
w ho feel a love of liberty.” Lopez and his men were favorably
com pared w ith the Founding Fathers. T o call them bandits,
the Republican Journal explained, “w ould make our forefath
ers rebels deserving of hanging, and of Lafayette, Rocham beau
...an d C ount Pulaski, ‘freebooters and pirates,’ terms w hich are
continually applied to the C uban arm y.”51

S u c h efforts by Democrats in the Pine Tree State were
largely successful. A lthough the Democracy’s national p la t
form was silent on C uban annexation, speakers touted the
merits of the island’s acquisition at mass meetings throughout
the country.5? D uring a New York stop on his stum p tour for
the national party, Senator Douglas declared it “ the duty of the
U nited States to seize it [Cuba] and hold it at all odds.” Such a
policy, he told his enthusiastic followers, “is the destiny of the
great Democratic party .” 53 T w o weeks earlier Douglas and
another loud representative of Y oung America, Senator Pierre
Soul£ of Louisiana, visited A ugusta to deliver this standard
stum p speech. There, in the fading w arm th of the sum m er of
1852, their addresses were applauded by an enthusiastic crowd
of Maine supporters.54
In the September elections of 1852, the M aine Democratic
party fared well. Democratic Governor H ubbard was re-elected,
and President Pierce captured the state by 12 percent of the
p o p u lar vote. In the presidential tally, where any concerns
about a foreign policy issue like C uban annexation w ould have
been expressed, Pierce recaptured many of the sw ing voters that
his party had lost to the Whigs in the 1848 election. A pathy
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am ong Free-Soil voters was another characteristic of the elec
tio n .55 If the Democrats’ Caribbean policy was a political liab il
ity, clearly it was not a debilitating one.
T h eir continued good fortune, however, was dependent
upon confidence in peaceful relations. Filibustering was not an
explosive issue because it seemed unlikely to precipitate h o stil
ities. T h e im portance of foreign trade and sh ip p in g to their
prosperity made Downeasters particularly sensitive to such
a prospect. Since the governm ent was not officially involved in
the attacks, there was little fear. Spain was too weak to fight and
thus only resorted to fierce protests lodged w ith the State
D epartm ent.56 T h e Portland Advertiser considered and then
dismissed the possibility of intervention by the form idable
British navy.57 T h e Democratic press also tried to discount the
possibility of w ar.58 T h e “ total and ridiculous failu re” of the
Cardenas Expedition inclined some to conclude that it was
“not probable we shall see another soon.”59 T h e failure of the
Bahia H onda landings and the execution of Lopez seemed to
assure the end of the filibustering and continued peace.
At the start of President Pierce’s term, leaders of his party
could see no end to their ascendancy. Mainers viewed his
adm inistration w ith a large measure of optim ism . T h e G rand
T ru n k R ailroad was nearly finished, and the state, particularly
the P ortland area, was entering a period of unprecedented
g row th.60 T h e new president had graduated from Bowdoin and
was a fam iliar quantity. From neighboring New H am pshire,
he offered not only Yankee com m on sense but the possibility of
a healthy portion of the federal spoils. In fact, the Downeast
coalition had been am ong the first to throw its support to
Y oung H ickory at the Baltimore convention.61 W hen he deli
vered his inaugural address, Pierce was secure in the knowledge
that M aine, w hich had long been a D em ocratic state, rem ained
securely in his p arty ’s grasp. Its legislature had, w ith few excep
tions, been controlled by the Democrats since the early days of
the Jacksonian Democracy. Beneath this placid surface, how 
ever, lay deep divisions over patronage, slavery extension, and
temperance. R ancor over the M aine Law precipitated an 1852
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gubernatorial rupture, but the sectional calm offered by the
Com prom ise of 1850, the unifying effects of federal patronage,
and the alm ost total defeat of the Free-Soil and W hig parties
seemed to herald a renewed vigor for Jackson’s adherents.62
In his inaugural address President Pierce spoke forcefully
on the subject of Cuba. Vowing that his adm inistration w ould
“not be controlled by any tim id forebodings of evil from expan
sio n ,” he prom ised continued American expansion. Speaking
specifically of Cuba, he reiterated its im portance to American
security and trade: “T h e acquisition of certain possessions not
w ithin our jurisdiction [is] em inently im p o rtan t for our p ro 
tection ... [and] essential for ... com merce.” Pierce followed his
discussion of expansion w ith a pledge to conduct foreign
affairs “ in a m anner entirely consistent w ith the strictest obser
vance of national faith and the cultivation of relations of
peace.”63 Pierce prom ised Cuba at no cost.
T h e address received alm ost universal praise in the Pine
Tree State; even W hig papers took u p the chorus. Pierce’s calm
insistence that foreign affairs be conducted w ith honor calmed
fears that filibustering missions w ould lead to war. “It is plain
t h a t ... no filibustering will be allowed under this ad m in istra
tion. T his is a good and gratifying doctrine,” was the satisfied
rem ark from the Kennebec Journal.64 T he state was further
reassured by the president’s first State of the U n io n address on
December 5, 1853. In it, the New H am pshire m an reiterated his
claim that “all means at my com m and w ill be vigorously
exerted to repress” any filibustering attem pts against C uba.65
For Downeasters, this prom ised calm, both w ith Spain and
the explosive slavery issue.

T h e Kansas-Nebraska Bill, introduced on January 4,
1854, re-ignited passions on this tender subject. T h e most con
troversial portion of Senator D ouglas’s bill allow ed territorial
governm ents to determine for themselves the legality of slavery.
Acceptance of this doctrine of “squatter sovereignty” included
an explicit repeal of the M issouri Com prom ise, w hich in 1820
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had banned slavery from L ouisiana Purchase land north of
36° 30'.66 Downeast, the measure evoked particularly strong
passions because the Pine Tree State, in tandem w ith M issouri,
had been adm itted to the U nion as a part of the com prom ise
w hich m aintained the balance between slave and free states. For
this reason M ainers felt personally involved in the Nebraska
debate. T h e b ill’s progress in C ongress and the various
speeches made there occupied the center of attention in the state
for the next four m onths. D uring this time, scarcely a news
paper appeared w ithout some editorial or bulletin on the sub
ject. As a result, the issue of C uban annexation largely disap
peared from p rin t, except as it related to the extension of
slavery.
Despite the ad m in istratio n ’s efforts to enforce party unity,
the bill divided the Pine Tree State as it did the country.67 Its
effect, the Farmington Chronicle explained, “m ust be to
weaken the ... dem ocratic party and to draw greater num bers
from a m iddle course to a decided stand on one or the other of
the extreme w ings.’’68 These two extreme factions, know n as
the W ildcats and Woolheads, had existed w ithin the Demo
cracy since the early 1840s, but previously, they had always been
able to com promise. Over the Nebraska bill, they broke —
W ildcats for, and W oolheads against.69 Many W oolheads were
still sm arting from Pierce’s division of election spoils, w hich
gave two of the sweeter plum s to prom inent W ildcat newspaper
men. Isaac C. Haynes of the Democrat was appointed Bangor
postm aster w hile B enjam in Kingsbury of the Eastern Argus
received the collectorship for the port of Portland; both men
had been strong supporters of the filibusterers.70 W hile p a tro n 
age insured their continued loyalty, it added bitterness to
attacks against the Nebraska legislation from the W oolhead
press.
M ost D ow neasters shared the negative sentim ents of
the W oolheads. H uge rallies, “ irrespective of p arty ,” convened
to protest the act.71 M aine Congressm an Israel W ashburn, a
W hig, helped fan the flames w hen he corresponded w ith
Charles C handler, a leader in his party, to arrange a series of
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such mass meetings in Somerset and Piscataquis counties.72
Protestant organizations also spoke out against the Nebraska
b ill.73 By the end of February, the Kennebec Journal claim ed
that only five of the alm ost fifty M aine new spapers still su p 
ported D ouglas’s initiative.74 O pponents com plained that the
measure was designed to spread slavery over more territory.
Some, like O ro n o ’s W ashburn, actually believed that the bill
was evidence of the aggressiveness of slavery.75
Such rhetoric in the W oolhead and W hig press created
fears of a conspiracy am ong southerners, designed to dom inate
the free N orth. T h is cry of conspiracy was first uttered in a
widely circulated m anifesto by Salm on P Chase of O hio, titled
‘‘T h e A ppeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the
People of the U nited States. ” Signed by several pro m in en t Free
Soilers, his letter identified the Nebraska bill as “an atrocious
p lo t” and “a bold scheme against American liberty.” Chase
called “on the people to come to the rescue of the country from
the dom ination of slavery.”76
Chase’s w arnings of a slavery conspiracy were echoed in
Maine. T h e threat of the “Slave Pow er,” in the words of a
Dover-Foxcroft convention of Nebraska opponents, “sum 
m ons the free N orth to rise in its m ig h t.”77 T he Nebraska Act
w ould open huge tracts of land to the peculiar institution; the
free states, they said, w ould be swept aside in a tide of black
slavery. T h e theme was picked up in the press. T h e Chronicle
warned of the “ascendancy of slavery.” 78 Such paranoid visions
not only sold papers but also became a rallying cry for the
Nebraska opposition and a symbol for the nascent R epublican
P arty .79 T h e sim plicity of the Slave Power argum ent was
accessible to the n o rm ally in d ifferen t masses, an d they
responded in a great o u tp o u rin g of em o tio n .80 C hase’s
“A ppeal” was so successful in m obilizing opposition to the
Nebraska Bill and slavery expansion in general that he w ould
later call it “ the most valuable [his italics] of my w orks.”81
M aine W oolheads blam ed their split w ith the national
leadership on the existence of this Slave Power cabal, w hich
had turned them out for adhering to the true principles of the
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Democracy — principles w hich were now being subverted by
the South. W ith his resignation from the Senate, Downeast
W oolhead H annibal H am lin cited its effort to make “ the flag
of the Federal U nion ... carr[y] slavery wherever it floats.” T his
gospel gave the W oolheads the m oral h ig h ground in their
bitter feud w ith the W ildcats for control of the party.82
In the m idst of this internecine controversy, the seizure of
the Black Warrior gave Pierce and the “ Y oung A m erica” circle
w ith in his adm inistration an o p p o rtu n ity to press for C uban
acquisition. T he vessel was owned by the New York and A la
bam a Steam ship C om pany and was part of a regular service
between New York and H avana. O n February 28, 1854, she was
confiscated by Spanish authorities, and her captain, James D.
Bulloch, was arrested for entering H avana w ith a m anifest that
declared her to be carrying only ballast w hen in fact she had a
cargo in transit.
In response to the seizure, Secretary of State W illiam L.
Marcy instructed Pierre Soul£, his m inister to Spain and for
merly a strong advocate of the filibusterers in the Senate, to
negotiate for the islan d ’s purchase. In M adrid, the L ouisiana
m an tightened the vice on his hosts by issuing an u ltim atu m
dem anding “im m ediate satisfaction from the wrong-doers at...
H av a n a” and threatening that Americans, if denied, w ould
then take “ the redress in their own h an d s.”83 T h e president also
hinted, though more obliquely, at war. “It is vain to expect that
... the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security
of these states can long consist w ith peaceful relations.”84
Saber rattlin g was echoed by the regular Democratic press
of Maine. T h e Eastern Argus, always a staunch advocate of the
Pierce adm inistration, cheered Soule’s ultim atum and the war
that it threatened to create. “Well, let it — A war w ith Spain
w ould take from her the brightest o f ... jewels. She holds Cuba
by a frail tenure.”85 Southerners were also ecstatic at the pros
pect of war. Pierce’s maneuvers prom ised finally to deliver
w hat three failed filibustering m issions had not: annexation of
Cuba.
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Maine’s newspaper editors saw Pierce’s belligerence toward Spain as a sign of a
growing “slave conspiracy” — part of an “infamous system of slavery agitation of
which the Nebraska Bill was the first stepand thedissolution of the Union is intended
to be the last.” Maine Historical Society Collections.

D o w n c a s t, the concurrence of the N ebraska Act and
threats of war w ith Spain added credence to fears of a slavery
conspiracy.86 T h e W hig and Courier saw C uban conquest as
part of an “infam ous system of slavery agitation of which the
Nebraska Bill was the first step and the dissolution of the
U nion is intended to be the last.”87 Passage of the Nebraska Act
changed the political clim ate completely and fused the connec
tion between D ouglas’s bill, Cuban annexation, and the slavery
conspiracy. Its surprise victory in the House, despite a m ajority
held there by the northern states, indicated the strength of the
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slave power. “Perfidious Slaveocracy T riu m p h a n t,” declared
B angor’s Jeffersonian.™ W oolhead organs like the Chronicle of
F arm ington and the O xford Democrat of South Paris, w hich
had largely been supportive of, or at least indifferent to C uban
an n ex atio n and the Black Warrior affair, saw this incident in a
new light after the victory of the Nebraska bill. T h e Oxford
Democrat explained that it was sim ply “preparation for ...
[further] aggrandizem ent of the slave power, the w resting of
C uba from Spain ... [and] the creation of yet other slave
states.”89
T h is nightm are was shared by W higs as well. Form er
governor Edward Kent referred specifically to Cuba as he
w arned O ro n o ’s Israel W ashburn of “ the m anifest schemes of
the Southern leaders to extend the area of slavery, indefinitely
by conquest, or purchase, or robbery.”90
T h e actions of Y oung America certainly seemed to be
m oving in this direction. O n May 1, L ouisiana Senator Jo h n
Slidell delivered a stirring address in w hich he advocated a
suspension of the neutrality laws w hich barred filibustering.91
Many in Maine worried that the address was “ the invitation of a
war between the U nited States on the one part against Spain,
E ngland, and France on the oth er.” 92 Pierce’s proclam ation on
filibustering, an attem pt to quell fears about a new expedition
being organized, was scoffed at in the Maine press.93
H is effort failed because Dow neasters questioned his
sincerity. Many reasoned that Young Hickory and his cabinet
were “puppets set in m otion by the South to do its w ill.”94 O n
this note at least, their cynicism was largely justified since
Pierce intim ated to the former L ouisiana governor that “ the
governm ent w ould not see them sacrificed.”95 At the Royal
C ourt in M adrid, the behavior of another Y oung American
from the Delta state, Pierre Soul£, and persistent “rum ors of his
indiscretions” w ith Spanish revolutionaries, com plicated the
already strained relations w ith that country and fanned war
fears still further.96
T h e W hig and W oolhead press exploited anxiety about
the slavery conspiracy and its war to get “Cuba at all costs.”
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Reports about the im m inence of war, the latest m ission against
the Spanish colony, and the role of the slave power in “forcing
the present adm inistration into ... the program m e of dam ning
in iq u itie s” accelerated the panic.97 T he opposition press
printed dire predictions of British intervention “ to save C u b a”
leaving Yankee sh ip p in g ruined and “our commerce des
troyed.”98 T h at this propaganda represented a reversal of ear
lier opinions expressed about the likelihood of war during
Lopez’s m issions was of little concern to leaders of the antiNebraska movement. W ith the British and French occupied in
the Crimea, such intervention was in fact unlikely. War fear,
however, was a valuable tool in forging a new political coali
tion that w ould become the R epublican party of M aine.99
T h e specter of war was vivid am ong Downeasters, who
could still remember the ru in atio n caused by the British block
ade of the War of 1812. Even Pierce’s loyal supporter, the
Eastern Argus, conceded that “peace is of m uch consequence to
the developm ent of our natural resources.” 100 T h e business
com m unity of Brunsw ick became so concerned that it
appointed J. C. H um phreys to write to their senator, H annibal
H am lin, “ to avert so disastrous consequences [as] w ould result
from w hat we consider an unnecessary collision with S p ain .”
H um phreys, a lum ber dealer himself, rem inded the chairm an
of the Senate Commerce Com m ittee of w hat he already under
stood: “T h e disastrous consequences that w ould result to the
w hole commerce of this country is [sic] incalculable. O ur state,
the 1st in No. of tons built and 3 in ow nership in the U nion,
w ould be the greatest sufferer! [his italics].” 101
Fears generated by the Nebraska Act, the slavery conspi
racy, and the prospect of war and com m ercial disaster created a
volatile political chemistry in Maine and throughout the
North. In the autum n election, Anson P. M orrill, a W oolhead,
carried the Pine Tree State w ith fifty percent of the vote, one
and a half times the total of the regular Democrat, A lbion K.
Parris. M orrill received the support of W higs and a legion of
voters norm ally silent at the polls who, moved by new spaper
hysteria and the repeal of the sacred M issouri Com prom ise,
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flocked to him in droves.102 Significantly most of these new
votes were cast in towns ' ‘engaged prim arily in m anufacturing
and m aritim e activities.” 101 These areas were most sensitive to
war and the pronouncem ents of the W oolhead and W hig press;
here, Pierce’s C uban policy and the opposition it solicited
certainly played an im portant role in defeating the regular
Democratic candidates.
For the president, elections in other northern states
brought equally grim news. His party lost in Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Iowa, O hio, Illinois, W isconsin,
New Jersey, and Indiana. T h e most dem oralizing loss, how 
ever, was New York, where not a single Democrat was returned
to Congress. Tw o thirds of the northern Democratic seats in
Congress were lost, along w ith the p arty ’s m ajority. Pierce,
who in 1852 had carried all but two of the northern states, faced
the prospect of a hostile Congress.104
O n November 4, 1854, the same day that the Democracy
lost the Em pire State, Secretary of State Marcy first received,
and the New York Tribune first published, the proceedings of
the infam ous conference at O stend between Soul6 and the U. S.
m inisters to E ngland and France, Jam es B uchanan and Jo h n
M ason.105 T his docum ent, the Ostend Manifesto, represented
in the words of one scholar, “ the highw ater m ark of the move
m ent to annex C uba before the Civil W ar.” It repeated the
standard strategic and econom ic logic of annexation. Its asser
tion that “by every law, h u m an and Divine, we shall be justified
in w resting it from S p ain ” was the m ost vigorous antebellum
effort to effect it.106
Soule’s manifesto, advocating war w ith Spain, was illtimed, given the ad m in istratio n ’s “crushing rebuke” at the
polls. W ith his p o p u larity w aning, Pierce could not even con
tem plate w ar.107 Marcy, his secretary of state, repudiated Soule,
w ho prom ptly resigned.108 Nonetheless, the dam age to Pierce’s
p o pularity was done.
News of the O stend M anifesto was, in the words of the
Portland Advertiser, “the last n a il” in the coffin of a political
corpse.109 M aine’s vigorous sh ip p in g and commercial interests,
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w hich had once favored Cuban annexation, trembled at the
threat of a destructive war to seize Cuba. For Downeasters,
the prospec t of war was further evidence that the dangerous
Slave Power dom inated the Democratic Party. New leaders
emerged in this tense atm osphere and fanned these fears. T he
resulting partisan realignm ent destroyed the old Democratic
party in Maine. T hough Pierce tried to reform the rem ains of
his party w ith a series of purges, the M aine organization woidd
not be strong enough to cast its electoral votes for a Democrat
until 1912, and even then only because of divisions in the
o p p o sitio n .110 Restrained by electoral developm ents in Maine
and elsewhere in the North, the president stepped back from his
aggressive cam paign to take Cuba; its acquisition w ould have
to wait until 1898, a full fourteen years before the Pine Tree
State would again go for a Democrat. T h o u g h economics had
stoked interest in annexation early on, the threat of war and a
heightened concern about slavery extension won out, as
Mainers contem plated Cuban annexation before the Civil War.
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NOTES
I would like to thank D. C. Smith for guiding me in this and my other
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comments. I have also benefited from the helpful suggestions of R. W. Judd
and several anonymous reviewers.
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